Exposé sur Husserl
Jeudi 8 mars 2012, 11h-13h
Abstract : Frege famously introduced the notion of sense to account for the different modes of givenness associated with expressions with the same reference. From the phenomenological point of view an expression is an expression only by virtue of certain acts by means of which one is related through that expression to its reference. A key step of Husserl’s Logical Investigations is the treatment of all acts according to a sense/reference scheme. This means that, for instance, perceptions are taken to have a sense, namely what Husserl calls act matter. With this extension of the sense/reference scheme, however, sense can no longer straightforwardly be identified with mode of givenness, for other moments of the act equally well deserve this title. I will first argue that Husserl’s notion of act matter is indeed a counterpart of Frege’s notion of sense, and thereafter go through three other moments of the act that determine a mode of givenness of the act’s intentional object: the act quality, the form of apprehension, and the act’s saturation (Fülle).
Bât. B, salle Danielle Corbin, B4 146.